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- How Will Lee Dong-chae Pass Down Ecopro? Spotlight on Family Firm Daisy Partners
- With the succession process of former Ecopro Chairman Lee Dong-chae underway, attention is turning to a family-owned company called Daisy Partners.
This company is 100% owned by Lee Dong-chae, the founder of Ecopro Group, and his family. More than just a management consulting firm, it is taking on a core role in the group’s governance structure and is emerging as a strategic base for the succession process.
△Background and Basic Profile of Daisy Partners
Daisy Partners was established in 2001 as a small enterprise mainly providing management information, tax and accounting services, and outsourcing for HR and payroll operations.
It was initially founded under the name “Iroom TNC” but changed its name to “Daisy Partners” in July 2023.
Despite being a small-capital company with KRW 700 million (US$ 487,000) in capital, its total assets exceeded KRW 2.17 trillion (US$ 1.51 billion) as of the 2023 fiscal year.
Daisy Partners has shown almost no revenue-generating activities in its official business areas. However, even without revenue, it has posted non-operating income in the hundreds of billions of won each year, setting it apart from conventional management consulting firms.
Its revenue structure primarily comes from dividends, interest income, and disposal of investment assets within the group affiliates. According to external audit reports, its non-operating income was about KRW 293.3 billion (US$ 204 million) in 2023 and non-operating expenses were KRW 140.6 billion (US$ 97.8 million). In 2024, non-operating income stood at about KRW 108.7 billion (US$ 75.6 million) and non-operating expenses at KRW 76.6 billion (US$ 53.3 million).
Nevertheless, Daisy Partners has continued to report operating losses for several years due to its lack of sales revenue.
△100% Family-Owned: Daisy Partners’ Shareholding Structure and Status
The largest shareholders of Daisy Partners are former Chairman Lee Dong-chae, his wife Kim Ae-hee, and their two children: eldest son Lee Seung-hwan, Executive Vice President of Ecopro, and daughter Lee Yeon-soo, Managing Director at Ecopro.
In terms of equity distribution, Lee and his wife each hold 20%, and the two children each own 30%.
Notably, both children—Executive Vice President Lee Seung-hwan and Managing Director Lee Yeon-soo—are engaged in actual management roles at the Future Strategy Division and the venture investment firm Ecopro Partners, respectively, while concurrently undergoing management training, indicating the succession process is actively progressing.
Lee Seung-hwan was promoted to Executive Vice President in December 2024 and has already taken on a key position within the group, solidifying his status as a second-generation leader. He is gaining practical experience in corporate management while preparing for a natural generational shift.
Daisy Partners holds about 4.8% of Ecopro's shares. As of May 2024, it also holds 3.5% of Ecopro BM, 9% of Ecopro Partners, 0.6% of Ecopro Materials, and 18% of Haepalangwoori.
While Daisy Partners continues to post operating losses with almost no sales, its capital size is expanding rapidly.
Its operating loss for the 2024 fiscal year was around KRW 580 million (US$ 403,000), but net profit reached KRW 24.5 billion (US$ 17 million), which is believed to result from accounting valuation gains and investment asset disposal profits.
In early 2024, Daisy Partners executed a large-scale transaction by selling about KRW 268.5 billion (US$ 186.7 million) worth of Ecopro and Ecopro BM shares on the open market. The company explained that the purpose of the sale was to fulfill debt repayment agreements and to secure donations for the establishment of a public interest foundation.
△Succession Cases in Korean Conglomerates and the Role of Daisy Partners
Succession of management rights in Korean conglomerates (chaebol) generally occurs through three main methods.
The first is by legitimately paying inheritance or gift taxes and transferring management rights, with recent examples including Samsung, LG, and Hanjin.
The second involves using lower-tier affiliates to increase value through internal transactions, thereby creating a financial base for succession. Notable examples include Hyundai Glovis’ role in the succession of Hyundai Motor Group Chairman Chung Eui-sun, and Samsung SDS being funneled group IT projects when Lee Jae-yong and the founding family held shares.
The third method involves the heir securing shares of a core company at the top of the group’s governance structure (holding company or de facto holding company) through another company where the heir is the major shareholder—usually an unlisted company—and then merging the two. Examples include the merger of Cheil Industries and Samsung C&T in Samsung Group, and the merger of SK and SK C&C in SK Group.
Other methods include donating affiliate shares to public interest foundations controlled by the owner family (e.g., DL Group), or using financial tools such as convertible bonds (CB), bonds with warrants (BW), or restricted stock units (RSU), as seen in the Samsung Everland convertible bond case.
In the case of Daisy Partners within the Ecopro Group, the structure appears more complex and somewhat different from traditional succession methods.
Daisy Partners, being a family-owned company with shares evenly held by Lee, his spouse, and children, stands at the center of major decision-making, stock ownership, and equity management within the group.
However, since the company does not generate operating profits as a business entity, it seems unlikely to serve as a direct financial source for succession.
△Role Within Ecopro Group and Succession Scenario
One expected scenario for utilizing Daisy Partners in the succession process of the Ecopro Group is to merge it with the holding company, Ecopro.
Ecopro transitioned to a holding company structure in 2021, establishing a governance model centered around former Chairman Lee Dong-chae. The Ecopro Group has adopted a structure that flows from “former Chairman Lee Dong-chae → Ecopro (holding company) → 12 affiliates,” with Daisy Partners holding 4.8% of Ecopro and serving as a key intermediary in this structure.
Lee’s activities—such as indirect shareholding, stock purchases, and exercising stock subscription rights through Daisy Partners—are interpreted as part of a succession strategy aimed at reorganizing group control around the family.
Since 2010, Daisy Partners has acquired Ecopro’s bonds with warrants (BW), exercised those rights, and secured many new shares, continuously expanding its investment scale.
Considering that Lee is not directly transferring shares or gifting them to his children but instead expanding control via the family company Daisy Partners, it is likely that this company will be used as the vehicle for management succession.
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that both of Lee’s children, Lee Seung-hwan and Lee Yeon-soo, were included in a recent restricted stock unit (RSU) allocation to employees within the Ecopro Group.
Although the number of shares they received—131 for Executive Vice President Lee Seung-hwan and 91 for Managing Director Lee Yeon-soo—is still small, this is interpreted as a move to increase equity ownership among second-generation management and reinforce responsible leadership.
#LeeDongchae #Ecopro #DaisyPartners #succession #Koreanchaebol #familybusiness #shareholding #RSU #governancestructure #investmentstrategy
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- Coupang Targets KRW 1 Trillion in Operating Profit as Bom Kim Increases Focus on Taiwan
- Bom Kim, Chairman of the Board at Coupang Inc. (the parent company of Coupang), has been frequently mentioning "Taiwan" in recent statements.
Kim previously expanded Coupang’s market presence in South Korea through a so-called “planned deficit” strategy. Now, he is applying that same approach to Taiwan, and early signs of progress are beginning to appear.
If this strategy proves successful in Taiwan—similar to a “blue spot” in Go AI terminology—it could accelerate Coupang’s path toward achieving KRW 1 trillion (US$ 695 million) in operating profit.
Coupang’s Q1 results, released on May 7, highlight the sharp rise in revenue from its Developing Offerings segment.
This division includes Coupang Play (an online video streaming service), Coupang Eats (a food delivery platform), the Taiwan business, and Farfetch, a luxury e-commerce platform.
Compared to its main Product Commerce division—which includes Rocket Delivery and Rocket Fresh—Developing Offerings remains small. In 2023, its revenue accounted for just 3.3% of that of Product Commerce. With the acquisition of Farfetch in 2024, it has grown, but still only represents 13.4% of Product Commerce’s revenue.
Still, the Q1 results suggest that the growth of this segment can no longer be ignored.
In Q1, Coupang reported revenue of US$ 1.038 billion from Developing Offerings. At a fixed exchange rate of KRW 1,452.66 per dollar, this exceeds KRW 1.5 trillion—marking a 78% increase from Q1 2024.
Considering that Coupang’s total revenue grew 21% year-over-year in Korean won and Product Commerce rose by 16%, it’s clear that Developing Offerings made a major contribution to the company’s growth.
Gross profit figures also showed strength in this segment.
Developing Offerings generated US$ 165 million in gross profit, with an 87% increase in Korean won terms—over three times the 28% growth in the Product Commerce division.
Though Developing Offerings is not yet profitable, Coupang posted an adjusted EBITDA of minus US$ 168 million for this division in Q1.
However, this loss was down roughly 10% from Q1 last year, suggesting that economies of scale are beginning to take hold—growing revenue while narrowing losses.
Among all components of the Developing Offerings, Kim is particularly focused on the Taiwan business.
He personally joined the Q1 earnings conference call and spoke for approximately 2 minutes and 20 seconds about Developing Offerings—over 1 minute and 20 seconds of which was dedicated to Taiwan.
By contrast, he spoke for just 25 seconds on Farfetch and 18 seconds on Coupang Eats, indicating his strong interest in the Taiwan operation.
He also personally answered a question about Taiwan from a Morgan Stanley analyst, instead of deferring to CFO Gaurav Anand, speaking for approximately 2 minutes and 7 seconds.
“One of the most exciting opportunities in our Developing Offerings is Taiwan,” said Kim. “Like in Korea, where we created jaw-dropping experiences for consumers, we see massive potential to do the same in Taiwan.”
According to Kim, Coupang is forming direct supply relationships not only with global brands like Coca-Cola, Pepsi, P&G, and Unicharm, but also with key local brands important to Taiwanese consumers. Coupang noted that its Taiwan product lineup grew sixfold in Q1 compared to Q4 of last year.
Coupang has also introduced its paid “Wow Membership” program—key to its explosive growth in Korea—to the Taiwan market. This is expected to be another growth catalyst. The Taiwan Wow Membership program offers free Rocket Delivery and returns within 30 days for a monthly fee of KRW 2,600 (US$ 1.80).
“This program provides tremendous value and savings to members, and like in Korea, we expect it to increase spending per member,” said Kim. “We’re excited about our investment in Taiwan, and we believe our already strong growth figures can go much higher.”
If Coupang’s Taiwan business, led by Kim, continues to gain momentum, its operating profit is expected to grow sharply as well.
Coupang reported Q1 operating profit of KRW 233.7 billion (US$ 162.5 million) based on a fixed exchange rate. While this appears lower than the KRW 435.3 billion (US$ 302.8 million) posted in Q4 2024, the previous quarter’s result included a one-time KRW 244.1 billion (US$ 169.8 million) insurance payout related to a fire at the Deokpyeong logistics center. Excluding that, the Q1 figure represents the company’s highest quarterly operating profit to date.
Coupang’s operating profit trajectory has been steadily improving: from KRW 53.1 billion (US$ 36.9 million) in Q1 2024, it slipped into the red in Q2, then recovered to a profit of KRW 148.1 billion (US$ 103.1 million) in Q3, and has continued to grow for three consecutive quarters.
Given this trend, some in the e-commerce industry believe that Coupang may achieve KRW 1 trillion (US$ 695 million) in annual operating profit for the first time this year.
#Coupang #BomKim #Taiwan #CoupangTaiwan #DevelopingOfferings #WowMembership #Farfetch #EcommerceGrowth #RocketDelivery #OperatingProfit
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- DL Group’s Shadow Holding Structure: Lee Hae-wook Gains Power, Avoids Accountability
- DL Group transitioned to a holding company structure in 2021, but the so-called "shadow holding company" governance structure established in the process continues to weigh heavily on Chairman Lee Hae-wook.
Under this structure, DL Group is ultimately controlled by the unlisted company Daelim. While Chairman Lee’s control over the group has increased, questions around managerial accountability have become more prominent.
△ Shadow Holding Structure Raises Accountability Concerns
As of May 7, DL Group operates under a three-tiered structure: unlisted Daelim at the top, listed DL in the middle, and various subsidiaries at the bottom.
Chairman Lee Hae-wook holds a 52.3% stake in unlisted Daelim, effectively giving him control over the entire group. However, this layered structure creates a scenario where the group leader can exert decision-making power without clearly defined accountability.
This has led to social controversy, particularly in cases involving serious industrial accidents. In such incidents, it remains ambiguous who should be held responsible due to the complexity of the governance model.
According to the Serious Accidents Punishment Act, employers and responsible executives can face criminal charges when workplace safety and health obligations are violated, leading to incidents such as fatalities.
However, based on the Ministry of Employment and Labor’s 2023 compilation of legal interpretations, corporate executives at the headquarters are generally not held responsible under the law if a serious accident occurs at a subsidiary, which is a separate legal entity.
As a result, the owner-executive who controls the top-tier unlisted company can influence critical business matters such as construction deadlines, yet evade legal accountability.
For example, since the Serious Accidents Punishment Act came into effect, DL E&C has been identified as one of the domestic conglomerates with the highest number of serious industrial accidents, with seven incidents leading to the deaths of eight workers. Still, Chairman Lee Hae-wook has not been held legally responsible.
Due to these recurring incidents, both political and civil society groups have urged for clearer executive accountability, emphasizing the need for responsible management and calling on Chairman Lee and other key executives to be directly answerable.
At a December 2023 parliamentary hearing on industrial accidents, Chairman Lee expressed his commitment to safety, though he did not accept legal liability.
Lee stated, “With recurring accidents, DL Group, along with our partners, is reviewing our processes and considering how to enhance safety awareness every time an incident occurs. We will reexamine relevant systems, including the right to stop work, to prevent such incidents from happening again.”
A legal expert commented, “Clarifying the corporate leader’s policy direction and accountability in the event of a serious accident is crucial for worker safety. But the ‘shadow holding company’ structure, which many large Korean conglomerates maintain, poses significant obstacles to clearly identifying and monitoring executive responsibility.”
△ Unlisted Daelim Shields the Group from Oversight
DL Group’s governance is under even greater scrutiny because Daelim, which sits at the core of the structure, is an unlisted company that remains largely unknown to the public. Unlike listed firms, unlisted companies have fewer disclosure obligations, making it harder for stakeholders to access internal information.
As a result, oversight and checks by minority shareholders and other market stakeholders become more difficult, undermining transparency and accountability in corporate governance.
Critics argue that this structure strengthens control while enabling avoidance of responsibility—a system where the group’s leader draws the overall blueprint, but specific lines of authority and accountability remain vague. This undermines shareholder confidence and trust in the broader market.
Given that major Korean conglomerates such as Hyundai Motor Group, Samsung Group, and SK Group are actively pursuing governance reforms and enhanced corporate responsibility, DL Group is also under growing pressure to resolve issues stemming from its layered governance structure.
Improving corporate governance could become a critical turning point for DL Group to regain market trust and achieve sustainable growth, especially in the context of addressing its industrial accident issues.
All eyes are now on whether Chairman Lee Hae-wook can tackle the dual challenges of simplifying and increasing the transparency of DL Group’s complex governance structure, and taking genuine managerial responsibility to prevent future safety incidents.
#DLGroup #LeeHaewook #corporategovernance #industrialaccidents #SeriousAccidentsAct #Daelim #transparency #Koreanchaebol #shadowholding #accountability
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- Choi Sung-an Breaks Samsung Heavy’s Loss Streak, Outsider Advantage Pays Off
- How did Choi Sung-an, Vice Chairman and CEO of Samsung Heavy Industries, rescue the company from nine years of losses?
Now, attention is focused on whether Choi can further stabilize Samsung Heavy Industries’ high debt ratio and continue improving its performance.
◆ Choi Sung-an’s Management Strategy to Break the Long Chain of Losses
From the moment he took office, Choi Sung-an has pushed strongly for innovation and profitability under the vision of building a “technology-driven centennial enterprise.”
At the regular shareholders' meeting held in March 2025 at the Pangyo R\&D Center in Bundang-gu, Seongnam, he stated, “To move toward becoming a technology-driven centennial enterprise, we will accelerate manufacturing innovation to lead the high-value eco-friendly ship business and cutting-edge autonomous navigation technologies.”
As an expert in plant engineering, Choi has focused on expanding offshore plant and marine businesses, aiming to enhance competitiveness in high-value-added markets.
In particular, Samsung Heavy Industries achieved a remarkable feat in the FLNG (Floating Liquefied Natural Gas) sector, winning five out of nine global orders based on its unrivaled technical expertise.
Choi is emphasizing this push for competitiveness to maintain the rebound in performance that the company has recently achieved.
From 2015 to 2022, Samsung Heavy Industries recorded consecutive annual losses for eight years, accumulating more than KRW 5 trillion (US\$ 3.5 billion) in operating losses.
This was the result of several compounding factors: entering the offshore plant business without preparation, a sharp drop in international oil prices, a global shipbuilding downturn, low-price bidding competition, and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.
From 2019 to 2021, the company posted net losses of around KRW 1 trillion (US\$ 695 million) annually, which deepened its financial instability.
◆ Improving Financial Structure While Managing Risks
Samsung Heavy Industries’ financial structure remains challenging, adding pressure on Choi. As of the end of 2023, the company’s consolidated debt ratio was 357.4%, and this slightly increased to 358.6% by the end of 2024.
While the shipbuilding industry inherently follows a “heavy-tail” structure—where an increase in orders leads to more contract liabilities and borrowings—this level of debt is still considered high.
Moreover, in the fourth quarter of 2024, the company incurred a KRW 744 billion (US\$ 517 million) loss from derivative valuation following the termination of a contract with Russia’s Zvezda Shipbuilding Complex, resulting in a pre-tax loss of KRW 478.4 billion (US\$ 333 million) and a net loss of KRW 99.3 billion (US\$ 69 million).
Such accounting issues have again highlighted the importance of transparent risk management as they pose short-term financial risks.
Fortunately, credit rating agencies have assessed that these accounting losses are not serious enough to shake the company’s fundamentals.
Kim Jong-hoon, a senior researcher at Korea Investors Service, said, “Considering that Samsung Heavy Industries has posted an operating surplus in 2023 and that the proportion of low-margin orders has steadily decreased, its fundamental profit-generating capacity is on an improving trend. Therefore, the financial burden from the derivative loss is manageable.”
Choi has also actively pursued asset optimization and capital expansion, including the KRW 400 billion (US\$ 278 million) sale of the Pangyo R\&D Center.
Even after the sale, the company continues to use the facility under a leaseback arrangement, securing funds for future investments. This “sales and leaseback” strategy is viewed as a proactive response to a rapidly changing business environment.
Efforts to enhance financial stability are also reflected in the reduction of net borrowings.
Samsung Heavy Industries’ consolidated net debt decreased by 13.9%, from KRW 2.88 trillion (US\$ 2 billion) at the end of 2023 to KRW 2.48 trillion (US\$ 1.7 billion) by the end of 2024.
◆ Focusing on Advanced Technologies and the Green Market to Strengthen Future Competitiveness
Choi is not just focusing on profitability—he is also actively pursuing technological innovation and expansion into the eco-friendly ship market.
Samsung Heavy Industries is accelerating smart manufacturing innovation by combining digital transformation (DT)-based production automation with artificial intelligence transformation to build a next-generation shipyard capable of operating 24 hours a day.
The company is especially focused on developing carbon capture, liquefaction, and storage (OCCS) facilities and expanding eco-friendly propulsion systems, enabling it to respond swiftly to the International Maritime Organization’s tightened environmental regulations.
These efforts are a key strategy for securing differentiated competitiveness in the rapidly changing global shipbuilding market. Samsung Heavy Industries’ proactive approach to advancing technology in the eco-friendly ship sector is attracting attention.
The company is also reinforcing growth momentum by targeting high-profit ship types such as LNG carriers, FLNG units, and LNG bunkering vessels, as well as the offshore plant sector.
FLNG projects, in particular, are massive—each worth over KRW 2 trillion (US\$ 1.4 billion). Samsung Heavy Industries has secured a dominant position in this segment, building a strong presence in the global market.
Its leadership has been further strengthened by the constraints placed on its Chinese rival, Wison Shipyard, due to U.S. trade sanctions.
◆ The Future of Samsung Heavy Industries Depends on Choi Sung-an’s Leadership
Under Choi’s leadership, Samsung Heavy Industries has escaped the pit of deficits and achieved notable financial results in 2024. However, some believe that this is only the beginning of its recovery.
Challenges still remain, such as further improving the financial structure, managing risks related to exchange rates and contracts, and maintaining a technological edge over competitors.
Nonetheless, Choi is widely regarded as a “quiet yet strong leader,” both within and outside the company, and many expect him to overcome these hurdles with resilience.
It is also reported that Samsung Electronics Chairman Lee Jae-yong has deep trust in Choi.
Choi was promoted from president to vice chairman in 2022 and became CEO of Samsung Heavy Industries. He is the first vice chairman-level executive to lead the company since Kim Jing-wan stepped down in 2010—a sign of how much Lee values him.
At the time of his appointment, there were concerns in the shipbuilding industry because Choi was not from a traditional shipbuilding background.
Born in 1960, Choi graduated from Seoul National University with a degree in mechanical engineering. He joined Samsung Engineering’s petrochemical business division in 1989 and later served as head of the refining business unit, procurement head in 2012, and head of Plant Business Division 1 in 2017.
However, in a short time, Choi dispelled these concerns and led Samsung Heavy Industries out of its long tunnel of losses.
Now, time will tell whether his steadfast strategy focusing on high-value ships, advanced technologies, and green transformation will lead to lasting success.
#SamsungHeavyIndustries #ChoiSungan #ShipbuildingTurnaround #FLNG #GreenShipTechnology #SmartShipyard #SamsungGroup #OffshorePlant #CorporateDebt #LeeJaeyongTrust
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- What Changes Does Kim Taek-jin Hope Lawyer Park Byung-moo Will Bring to NCSoft?
- Seoul National University Law School, Harvard Law School, Kim & Chang law firm, and CEO of a private equity fund.
This is the career background of Park Byung-moo, CEO of NCSoft. At a glance, it is clear that he has lived a life entirely unrelated to gaming.
Park is a corporate restructuring expert. His career has focused on restructuring companies in crisis, improving their financials and operations, and preparing them for sale. With repeated successes in restructuring and sales, he earned the nickname “Midas’ hand” in the private equity industry.
Now, Park has become the captain of the game company NCSoft. So, what exactly does Kim Taek-jin, the founder and co-CEO of NCSoft, expect from him?
△Not a Sales Specialist, but a Revival Strategist — Kim Taek-jin’s True Intentions
Based solely on Park’s background, one might naturally wonder, “Is Kim Taek-jin planning to sell NCSoft?”
However, within the game industry, the possibility of Kim selling NCSoft is generally considered low. This is due to his strong attachment to both the company and its Lineage franchise. As one of the first-generation leaders of the Korean game industry, alongside the late Nexon founder Kim Jung-ju, it is hard to imagine Kim selling off NCSoft.
A closer look at Park’s actual work in corporate “makeovers” sheds light on what mission Kim may have entrusted him with.
Park is not the type of restructuring expert who simply prettifies a company’s financial statements for a sale. Instead, he has engaged in projects closer to “corporate rebuilding,” where he restructures companies suffering deep losses or declining valuations, revives their core assets, and restores their market competitiveness.
The clearest example of Park’s capabilities is the case of Hanaro Telecom.
After being appointed president of Hanaro Telecom, Park immediately launched an ambitious project called “Hana TV.” Hana TV became a pioneer in what is now the mainstream IPTV market, and was a decisive factor in SK Telecom’s decision to acquire Hanaro Telecom.
Eventually, Hanaro Telecom was reborn under SK Telecom as SK Broadband, now a key affiliate responsible for SK Group’s IPTV and wired internet businesses.
Park is also recognized for his sharp eye in discovering undervalued yet promising companies and bringing them back to life.
After becoming CEO of Vogo Fund (now VIG Partners) in 2010, Park led successful acquisitions and revivals of 17 companies, including Tongyang Life Insurance, BC Card, iRiver, Burger King, and Bodyfriend.
△Diagnosing NCSoft’s Crisis — Park Byung-moo Declares Structural Reform
In his first message following the 2024 shareholders’ meeting, Park stated, “The most important task is to restore trust as a game company,” and added, “We will regain strength based on the Lineage IP while pursuing strategic M&As to secure new content capabilities.”
NCSoft’s chronic risks include over-reliance on the so-called “Lineage-only” revenue structure, a lack of global influence compared to competitors, and uncertainty about the company’s future stemming from these factors.
Park believes that unless NCSoft fundamentally changes its corporate structure, its competitiveness will continue to decline. To break this cycle, he is proposing external content acquisition through M&A and a revamp of the company’s internal development capabilities.
At the 2025 shareholders’ meeting, Park said, “We are reorganizing our existing IPs while raising the evaluation standards for upcoming titles and rigorously monitoring the development process,” adding, “Many have worked tirelessly on M&A and investment, and this year, I hope we will see results that are clearly visible to everyone.”
△The Arrival of a Corporate Healer — Where Is NCSoft Headed?
Kim Taek-jin’s decision to appoint Park as co-CEO appears to stem from a desire to transform NCSoft into a more sustainable company.
Park’s past achievements largely focus on fixing and reviving malfunctioning companies.
Until now, Kim has led NCSoft with an intense focus on Lineage. Some say there was even a sentiment within the company that "Lineage is the perfect game, so all games should be made the same way."
Park is expected to take a completely different approach to interpreting and restructuring NCSoft.
Much like how Hanaro Telecom maintained its core “wired internet” business while layering on new content like Hana TV, Park is likely to maintain Lineage’s competitiveness while seeking new business opportunities through M&A and innovation.
A game industry insider commented, “NCSoft’s biggest problem is not just the decline in Lineage sales, but the failure of all other new titles outside of Lineage,” adding, “Whether through IP acquisitions or internal development, the true test of NCSoft’s successful restructuring will be whether it can launch a completely new hit title.”
#ParkByungmoo #NCSoft #KimTaekjin #Lineage #corporaterestructuring #M&Astrategy #VIGPartners #IPTV #gamedevelopment #Koreangameindustry
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- HYBE Bets on KATSEYE to Boost Girl Group Success
- Bang Si-hyuk, chairman of HYBE and a former star music producer, played the most significant role in establishing HYBE as a dominant player in the entertainment industry. Thanks to the phenomenal success of BTS, HYBE has become the most valuable K-content company.
However, even Chairman Bang has struggled when it comes to girl groups. HYBE currently manages four girl groups under its various labels, but three of them are experiencing ups and downs.
The underperformance of its girl groups poses a challenge for HYBE as it tries to diversify its portfolio, given that its financial performance relies heavily on boy groups like BTS and SEVENTEEN.
According to the entertainment industry on the 29th, HYBE appears to be attempting a comeback in the girl group arena through "KATSEYE."
KATSEYE is a girl group under HYBE Universal, a joint venture between HYBE and Geffen Records, a subsidiary of Universal Music Group. On the 30th, the group will release a pre-release single titled “Gnarly” from their second EP. HYBE holds a 51% stake in HYBE Universal.
KATSEYE is a multinational girl group created by HYBE with the global market in mind.
This marks their return to official promotional activities about four months after their Christmas season debut in December last year. While their performance wasn’t bad back then, this new activity is crucial for HYBE given the overall lackluster performance of its girl groups.
After fromis_9, formerly under Pledis Entertainment, decided not to renew their contract, HYBE now has four girl groups: LE SSERAFIM (under Source Music), NewJeans (under ADOR), ILLIT (under Belift Lab), and KATSEYE (under HYBE Universal).
However, the outlook is not positive for the other three groups besides KATSEYE. NewJeans has suspended activities due to a management dispute between former ADOR CEO Min Hee-jin and HYBE that began in April 2024.
NewJeans is not the only group affected. Min claimed that LE SSERAFIM debuted before NewJeans unfairly and that ILLIT imitated NewJeans. Industry insiders say that these allegations have significantly damaged the public image of LE SSERAFIM and ILLIT.
Indeed, both groups have seen a noticeable drop in performance.
In the K-pop industry, the "initial album sales"—the number of albums sold within the first week of release—are considered a key metric. Both LE SSERAFIM and ILLIT have fallen short in this regard.
LE SSERAFIM sold 990,000 copies of their third mini album “EASY” in February 2024. However, their fourth mini album “CRAZY” in August 2024 and the fifth mini album “HOT” in March 2025 sold only 680,000 and 630,000 copies, respectively. All three albums were executive produced by Bang Si-hyuk, chairman of HYBE’s board of directors.
In contrast, SM Entertainment’s girl group aespa sold 1.15 million copies of “Armageddon” in May 2024 and 910,000 copies of “Whiplash” in October 2024. Compared to that, LE SSERAFIM's performance seems underwhelming.
LE SSERAFIM’s slump is reflected in the business performance of their label, Source Music. According to HYBE, Source Music recorded a net profit of KRW 6.59 billion (US$ 4.6 million) in 2024, a 50% drop compared to 2023. Quarterly figures show a consistent decline—from KRW 4.4 billion (US$ 3.1 million) in Q1, to KRW 1.7 billion (US$ 1.2 million) in Q2, and KRW 1.5 billion (US$ 1.0 million) in Q3—culminating in a net loss of KRW 1 billion (US$ 700,000) in Q4.
Given that LE SSERAFIM is the only artist under Source Music, its business performance essentially reflects that of the group.
ILLIT is also facing challenges. Their debut album “SUPER REAL ME” released in March 2024 and “I’LL LIKE YOU” released in October 2024 both recorded initial sales of 380,000 copies. The debut track “Magnetic” even reached No. 1 on Melon’s daily chart in March 2024.
However, after the ADOR controversy, the single “Cherish (My Love)” released in October only reached 52nd on the Melon daily chart—a key indicator of mainstream popularity.
The performance of HYBE’s girl group KATSEYE is drawing attention because of HYBE’s over-reliance on boy groups. From a revenue diversification and risk management perspective, it’s not healthy for a company to depend so heavily on boy group earnings.
In 2024, the combined revenue of the four HYBE subsidiaries managing its girl groups totaled KRW 570.5 billion (US$ 396.8 million), about 25% of HYBE’s total revenue. But this includes sales from boy group ENHYPEN under Belift Lab, suggesting that the actual share from girl groups is likely even lower.
HYBE’s competitors show a different picture.
At JYP Entertainment, girl groups accounted for 6.87 million out of the 13.675 million albums sold in 2024—roughly 50%. While album sales don’t directly equate to business performance due to other revenue streams like concerts and merchandise, this does illustrate a well-balanced portfolio.
At YG Entertainment, girl groups like BLACKPINK and BABYMONSTER dominate in album sales, while the boy group TREASURE leads in concert attendance. Of the 2.03 million albums YG sold in 2024, BABYMONSTER and BLACKPINK accounted for 1.59 million and 230,000 copies respectively—90% of the total. For concerts, TREASURE drew 590,000 attendees, accounting for 82% of YG’s total 720,000.
Chairman Bang also appears eager for the success of HYBE’s girl groups.
On April 22, he posted a photo on social media with members of LE SSERAFIM, ILLIT, and KATSEYE, tagging it with the hashtag #ONETEAM—signaling his strong commitment to the success of HYBE’s girl group lineup.
#HYBE #BangSiHyuk #Kpop #KATSEYE #LE_SSERAFIM #ILLIT #NewJeans #GirlGroups #KpopIndustry #EntertainmentBusiness
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- KDB Chairman Kang Seog-hoon’s Final Missions: Ending Ties with Hanwha Ocean and Accelerating HMM Stake Sale
- Kang Seog-hoon, the Chairman of KDB Korea Development Bank, is accelerating the sale of shares in Hanwha Ocean as his term nears its end.
After successfully finding a new owner for Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering (now Hanwha Ocean) early in his term, Kang appears poised to wrap up his tenure by selling the bank’s remaining shares in Hanwha Ocean.
There is also speculation that Kang might prepare to sell KDB’s stake in HMM to strengthen the bank’s financial soundness.
According to KDB on April 29, the bank is conducting demand forecasting to sell part of its 19.5% stake in Hanwha Ocean through a block deal (off-hours bulk trading).
At the end of 2022, KDB held 55.68% of Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering, but in 2023 it transferred majority ownership to Hanwha Group, reducing its stake to the current level.
A KDB official said, "In May 2023, the management rights of Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering were transferred to Hanwha Group, and restructuring goals such as performance improvement were achieved," adding, "At the time, it was decided to sell the remaining shares at an appropriate time, and with the industry recovering and restructuring goals achieved, we are now proceeding with the sale."
Industry insiders expect KDB to gradually reduce its Hanwha Ocean stake based on the results of the demand forecasting.
If KDB sells off its remaining Hanwha Ocean shares over the medium to long term, it will bring an end to the bank’s long-standing relationship with Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering, which dates back to 2000.
Although the relationship between KDB and Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering stretches back to the 1970s when Daewoo Group acquired the Okpo Shipyard, KDB has held its current form of shareholding since 2000.
After the collapse of Daewoo Group during the Asian financial crisis, KDB became the largest shareholder of Daewoo Shipbuilding through a debt-for-equity swap in 2000.
The company’s name was later changed to Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering in 2002. Despite multiple privatization attempts, KDB struggled to find a buyer.
The most notable failed attempts were in 2008 and 2019.
In 2008, KDB selected Hanwha Group as the preferred bidder, but the global financial crisis thwarted the deal in 2009. In 2019, it reached a formal agreement with Hyundai Heavy Industries, but the European Union rejected the acquisition in 2022, causing the deal to collapse again.
Kang Seog-hoon is credited as the key figure who successfully sold Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering.
After being appointed Chairman of KDB in June 2022, Kang accelerated the sale process and selected Hanwha Group as the preferred bidder in September of that year.
In effect, Kang led the privatization immediately after taking office. At a press conference marking his first anniversary as Chairman in June 2023, he cited the privatization of Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering as his biggest achievement.
Throughout his term, Kang supported the relocation of KDB’s headquarters to Busan, a major pledge of former President Yoon Suk-yeol, often clashing with labor unions and the opposition Democratic Party.
Despite political controversies, Kang, an economist and former professor, successfully handled major tasks including the sale of Daewoo Shipbuilding, the merger of Korean Air and Asiana Airlines, the sale of SsangYong Motor, and the restructuring of Taeyoung Construction.
Kang’s three-year term, which started on June 7, 2022, will end on June 6, 2025. Given that a new government will take office after the presidential election on June 3, his chances of reappointment are considered low.
Thus, Kang’s move to sell off the remaining Hanwha Ocean shares is seen as his final effort to conclude the relationship he initiated by finding a new owner for Daewoo Shipbuilding early in his tenure.
Kang’s decision to sell Hanwha Ocean shares is also aimed at improving KDB’s financial health.
Selling the shares would increase KDB’s Basel III capital adequacy ratio, allowing the bank to expand investments in new areas such as semiconductors and artificial intelligence (AI).
As of the end of last year, KDB’s Basel III capital adequacy ratio was 13.9%, the lowest among major domestic banks. This was a drop of over 3 percentage points from 14.36% at the end of the third quarter, barely above the Financial Supervisory Service’s recommended level of 13%.
To prevent a further drop, KDB carried out about KRW 2.4 trillion (US$ 1.73 billion) in capital increases last year, including a stock contribution from Korea Land and Housing Corporation (LH), but only achieved a temporary improvement.
In 2025, KDB continued to boost its capital with over KRW 200 billion (US$ 144 million) in increases in February and March and is planning additional capital raises.
As a policy bank responsible for supporting domestic industries, KDB needs a strong capital base to ensure it can pursue new investments without restrictions.
Since taking office, Kang has repeatedly emphasized the importance of the "golden time" for investments in strategic industries. Last year, he introduced the "Korea Rebound Program," pledging KRW 100 trillion (US$ 72 billion) over three years for policy financing in sectors such as semiconductors and AI.
Improving KDB’s capital adequacy ratio is essential for boosting new investments, and selling stock assets like Hanwha Ocean shares can significantly help.
When calculating the Basel III ratio, risk-weighted assets (RWA) are included in the denominator. Since stock assets carry relatively high risk weights, selling them reduces RWAs.
For these reasons, there is speculation that Kang may also prepare to sell KDB’s stake in HMM before his term ends.
Speaking with reporters after the "NextRound Silicon Valley" event in the U.S. on April 23, Kang said, "We are seriously considering the sale of HMM shares."
According to Kang, under Basel III regulations, if a bank holds more than 15% of its equity capital in a single company’s shares, a risk weight of 1250% is applied to the excess portion.
If HMM’s stock price exceeds KRW 18,600 (US$ 13.4), a 1250% risk weight applies. HMM’s stock closed at KRW 18,660 (US$ 13.5) the previous day.
Kang added, "If HMM’s stock price exceeds KRW 25,000 (US$ 18.1), maintaining a 13% capital adequacy ratio would be at risk," and stressed, "No matter how close I am to the end of my term, I cannot put KDB in a dangerous situation."
#KangSeoghoon #KDB #HanwhaOcean #HMM #BISCapitalRatio #Privatization #DaewooShipbuilding #IndustrialBanking #KoreaReboundProgram #FinancialStability
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- LG H&H Must Pivot to North America; Lee Jung-ae Faces Task of Finding the Next "Whoo"
- Lee Jung-ae, the CEO and President of LG Household & Health Care (H&H), has continued to focus on North America as a key market since taking office, maintaining a steady pace of investment.
Building on the foundation laid by former CEO Cha Suk-yong through multiple acquisitions of North American beauty companies, she has recently participated in a capital increase for the North American subsidiary, accelerating efforts to penetrate the local market.
However, unlike the remarkable success of "The History of Whoo" in China, LG H&H has yet to achieve notable results in North America. Industry insiders express growing concerns that continued delays in discovering new growth brands tailored to North American consumer preferences could render current investments less effective.
As of April 29, an overview of LG H&H’s performance indicates that the recovery of the cosmetics division, which had struggled post-COVID-19, remains sluggish.
In the first quarter of this year, LG H&H’s cosmetics division recorded consolidated sales of KRW 1.6979 trillion (US$ 1.22 billion) and an operating profit of KRW 142.4 billion (US$ 102.7 million), representing a 1.8% drop in sales and a 5.7% decline in operating profit compared to the first quarter of last year.
Although sales in North America rose by 3.1% year-over-year, they accounted for only 7% of total sales.
Heo Je-na, an analyst at DB Financial Investment, noted, “The growth in overseas sales for LG H&H’s cosmetics division remains minimal,” adding, “When measured in local currencies, sales in China and the U.S. declined by about 10% and 6%, respectively.”
Following the sharp post-COVID-19 decline in China, once its core market, LG H&H has been actively seeking new growth engines, identifying North America as the next major market after China and continuing strategic investments.
To target North America, LG H&H actively pursued mergers and acquisitions to expand its local business presence.
Notably, it acquired North American cosmetics company, The Avon Company, for approximately KRW 145 billion (US$ 104.5 million) in 2019, acquired rights to the Physiogel brand in Asia and North America in 2020, purchased shares of haircare brand Boinca in 2021, and acquired shares of U.S. cosmetics brand The Crème Shop in 2022.
A total of about KRW 605.1 billion (US$ 436.3 million) was invested across these four North American acquisitions.
More recently, the company participated in a KRW 186 billion (US$ 134.1 million) capital increase for its North American subsidiary.
Of this, KRW 100 billion (US$ 72.2 million) will be used to support the subsidiary’s operations and improve its financial structure, while KRW 86 billion (US$ 62.0 million) will support the operations of its affiliate, The Avon Company.
To strengthen its North American business, Lee Jung-ae has been actively expanding marketing for various beauty and personal care (BPC) brands such as The Face Shop, CNP, and Belif, primarily through Amazon. The recent capital increase and support for The Avon Company are seen as part of this strategy.
However, despite aggressive investments, critics point out that tangible results in North America remain elusive.
The absence of a local "key product lineup" similar to "The History of Whoo" is cited as a major reason for underperformance. Comparisons with APR, which has successfully entered the North American market, further highlight the gap.
APR quickly gained a foothold in North America by getting multiple products from its brands Medicube and Aprilskin into Amazon’s top rankings. Medicube’s Pore Toner Pad even ranked number one in the skincare category on Amazon.
APR’s success is largely attributed to "cost-effectiveness." Their products are priced between $10 and $20 while maintaining high quality, about half the price of similar products from French or American brands.
This clearly illustrates the difficulty premium brands like "The History of Whoo" face in the highly competitive North American market.
Targeting the high demand among local consumers for basic skincare products with features such as skin texture improvement and low-irritant ingredients also proved effective.
Indeed, the core strategy behind K-beauty’s success has emphasized "basic care over color cosmetics" and "cost-effective positioning due to low manufacturing costs."
However, quickly reducing LG H&H’s heavy dependence on "The History of Whoo" premium brand is not easy.
Currently, more than half of LG H&H’s cosmetics revenue comes from "The History of Whoo." In the first quarter of this year, "The History of Whoo" accounted for 51% of major brand sales, followed by The Face Shop at 8% and CNP at 4%.
Under former CEO Cha Suk-yong, LG H&H concentrated a significant portion of its corporate resources on the Chinese market. Before COVID-19, trillion-won-level revenues were generated solely in China, and most sales networks and manpower were aligned with the Chinese market.
Even the company’s legal team had several patent attorneys specializing in China, reflecting its heavy dependence on China and "The History of Whoo."
Industry experts agree that it will take significant time to pivot strategies and infrastructures once heavily geared toward China to succeed in the U.S. market.
Given that LG H&H had a strong success model with "The History of Whoo" in China, its production systems and organizational structures are likely still centered around that model.
The contrast with APR’s diversified brand portfolio strategy aimed at North America is even more pronounced.
While APR pursued market diversification from the beginning, LG H&H, with its longstanding focus on premium brands, now faces the challenge of establishing a fresh foundation in North America.
Experts argue that successfully entering the North American market will require investments and long-term brand-building efforts many times greater than before.
An LG H&H official stated, “We plan to strengthen brand awareness and growth foundations in the Americas by expanding marketing investments in beauty and personal care brands such as The Face Shop, CNP, Belif, and Dr. Groot,” adding, “We will also enhance marketing activities centered on color and derma brands to expand our product influence in the Japanese market.”
#LeeJungAe #LGHouseholdAndHealthCare #NorthAmericaExpansion #TheHistoryofWhoo #CosmeticsBusiness #KBeauty #APR #Medicube #GlobalStrategy #BeautyIndustry
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- LG Bets on Premium LCD TVs Amid TV Business Slump
- LG Electronics is increasingly likely to post an operating loss in its TV business in 2025.
This is attributed to weakened consumer sentiment caused by high interest rates and inflation, as well as the potential impact of U.S. countervailing tariffs that are expected to take effect in the second half of the year.
Park Hyoung-sei, President of LG Electronics’ Media Entertainment Solution (MS) Company, is focusing on securing profitability by expanding the company’s premium TV lineup from OLED (organic light-emitting diode) to include LCD (liquid crystal display)-based QNED TVs.
According to industry sources on the 29th, global TV shipment growth is projected to slow further in 2025 due to declining global consumer demand.
Chinese market research firm Sigmaintell forecasted that global TV shipments will reach 217.8 million units this year, representing only a 0.5% increase from the previous year. This is less than half of last year’s 1.3% growth rate.
As the global TV market stagnates, LG Electronics is struggling to maintain its market share amid intensifying competition from Chinese companies. In 2024, LG’s market share in North America stood at just 10%, falling behind China’s TCL and Hisense, which each held 14%.
Moreover, there are growing concerns that LG’s TV business may fall into the red this year. Securities firms have projected that the MS Company, which recorded KRW 268 billion (US$ 186.3 million) in operating profit last year, will post an operating loss of approximately KRW 210 billion (US$ 146 million) in 2025.
Lee Min-hee, an analyst at BNK Investment & Securities, said, “The MS Company is expected to see a 6% year-over-year decline in sales in the second quarter due to deteriorating market conditions,” adding, “Macroeconomic uncertainties, such as the imposition of countervailing duties, remain high, and their impact will gradually become more visible.”
Until now, Park has led LG’s strategy of targeting the premium TV market with OLED TVs.
According to market research firm Omdia, LG Electronics achieved a 52.4% global market share in OLED TV shipments in 2024, ranking first for the 12th consecutive year. However, due to the high production costs and sales prices of OLED TVs, their mass adoption remains limited.
OLED TVs still account for only around 10% of the entire global TV market.
As a result, Park is partially shifting strategy to focus more heavily on the company’s premium LCD TV lineup—QNED TV.
While maintaining competitiveness at the highest end of the market with OLED, the aim is to fend off Chinese competitors with QNED TVs in the premium LCD segment.
Park previously stated, “We will strengthen our leadership in the global premium TV market with a ‘dual-track’ strategy consisting of OLED TVs with overwhelmingly vivid self-emissive picture quality and QNED TVs that incorporate advanced technology.”
QNED TVs feature nanotechnology-based high color reproduction and AI-powered picture optimization, improving color accuracy by 20–30% compared to conventional LCDs. At the same time, they are 20–30% cheaper than OLED TVs of the same size.
As such, LG aims to aggressively target consumers who seek better picture quality than standard LCD TVs but find OLED TVs too expensive.
At the “TV New Product Briefing” held on March 11, Baek Sun-pil, Head of TV Product Planning at LG Electronics, said, “If OLED is like a Genesis, QNED would be a Grandeur,” adding, “You could buy an 86-inch QNED for the price of a 65-inch OLED. There is a trade-off, but we believe it’s better to target both consumer groups that exist across these two categories.”
Additionally, LG Electronics is applying technologies previously exclusive to OLED—such as the “wireless AV transmission solution”—to QNED TVs to further differentiate them. This technology enables high-resolution video transmission without signal loss or latency.
Alongside the QNED TV push, LG is also expected to accelerate expansion into high-margin platform businesses such as webOS-based advertising and content services.
An LG Electronics spokesperson said during the earnings conference call on the 24th, “Overall demand for the TV market is expected to remain stagnant this year,” and added, “By reassessing resource allocation and operating marketing resources more efficiently, we will maintain the MS Company’s profitability.”
#LGElectronics #ParkHyoungsei #TVBusiness #QNED #OLED #OperatingLoss #webOS #TCL #Hisense #TVMarket2025
